This article analyzes the position of Ibn Hilāl, who is regarded as nāsıbī and ghālī, in the science of Shia rijāl, his reports and the validity of the accusations against him. It is found that narrators are criticized for various reasons in the science of Shiʻa rijāl. Some of them are the Shiite followers that the imams cursed and wanted to be kept away from their adherence. It is seen that the narrations reported by some of the narrators are included (...) in the main sources of Shiite hadith, albeit these narrators were cursed by the innocent imams. Ahmed Ibn Hilāl (d. 267/880) is one of these narrators cursed by the imams and his name is found in the report (the isnād) of many early narrations. Ibn Hilāl, one of the close companions of Shia's 10th imam Ali b. Muḥammed al-Hādī (d. 254/868) and 11th imam Ḥasan al-ʻAskarī (d. 260/874), was first cursed by the letter of al-Askarī allegedly sent, and the Shiite followers were ordered to move away from him. Ibn Hilāl refused to accept the ambassadoriality of Muḥammed b. Osman (d. 305/918), the ambassador of the 12th Imam. Thus, he was cursed by Muḥammad al-Mahdī as well. In later periods, Ibn Hilāl was accused of being nāsıbī and ghālī. However, there are also some Shiite scholars who supported (tavthîk) Ibn Hilāl. In the Shi'a tradition, Nāsibism indicated the meaning of hating ʻAli and Ahl al-bayt or feeling anger towards them. Later on, this meaning has been changed into a meaning including the haters of ʻAli and then the Shiʻa Nāsibism is regarded as a position towards Shiʻa outside of Shiʻa. Ghulāt is a form of a belief generally found in the Shi'a tradition. In the belief of Ghulāt, holiness is attributed to the imams. When the Shiite sources are examined, it can be seeb that Ibn Hilāl represents neither a ghālī nor a nāsıbī position. In the Shiʻa, when the narrator leaves his sect, his narrations are evaluated differently. Therefore, among Ibn Hilāl's narrations only those which narrated before he left can be accepted. The likely reason for this attitude can be those narrators such as Ibn Hilāl brought in many narrations to the Shiite hadith literature. Ibn Bābeveyh and Sheikh Sadūk reported many narrations that includes Ibn Hilāl in their report chain (the isnad). Among these narrations, they criticized only one. Again, in the 4th century of Hijrī, Numānī, al-Hazzāz, Ibn Qavlaveyh and Mufīd reported many narrations transmitted by Ibn Hilāl. However, none of them mentioned about the negative perception on Ibn Hilāl in any of these narrations. This shows that Ibn Hilāl was not regarded as nāsıbī or ghālī in the eyes of the these scholars. As regards to, Tūsī, in the 5th century after Hijra, claimed that Ibn Hilāl was a ghālī and he was accused of being an adherent to this religion. He narrated in sum fifty narrations that included Ibn Hilāl in the report chain, but Tūsī criticized only three of them because of including Ibn Hilāl. The reason why Ibn Hilāl was accused of being nāsıbī and ghālī, which Shiʻa deemed the worst, was probably related to the political conditions of that period. On the other hand, there is no report that Ibn Hilāl shared a nāsıbī and ghālī thought or had a tendency towards them. It is obvious that if Ibn Hilâl, who has an important place in the eyes of the Shiite community, does not accept the second ambassador of al-Mahdī, and that this would cause discord among the followers. This complex situation was tried to be remedied by letters alleged to have been written by the imams, cursing Ibn Hilâl and ordering them to stay away from him. Later, Ibn Hilāl was accused of being a nāsıbî or ghālī who expressed the attitudes and thoughts that Shiʻa saw the most distant from him. Sadūk first reported the narration that Ibn Hilāl was Nāsıbî. Tūsī, on the other hand, described Ibn Hilāl as ghālī in the 5th century (after hijra). This study tries to reveal that there is no explicit evidence that proves Ibn Hilāl’s nāsıbī or ghālī position. (shrink)

The Arabic philosophical fable _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _is a classic of medieval Islamic philosophy. Ibn Tufayl, the Andalusian philosopher, tells of a child raised by a doe on an equatorial island who grows up to discover the truth about the world and his own place in it, unaided—but also unimpeded—by society, language, or tradition. Hayy’s discoveries about God, nature, and man challenge the values of the culture in which the tale was written as well as those of every contemporary society. (...) Goodman’s commentary places _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _in its historical and philosophical context. The volume features a new preface and index, and an updated bibliography. “One of the most remarkable books of the Middle Ages.”—_Times Literary Supplement_ “An enchanting and puzzling story.... The book transcends all historical and cultural environments to settle upon the questions of human life that perpetually intrigue men.”—_Middle East__ Journal_ “Goodman has done a service to the modern English reader by providing a readable translation of a philosophically significant allegory.”—_Philosophy East and West_ “Add[s] bright new pieces to an Islamic mosaic whose general shape is already known.”—_American Historical Review_. (shrink)

Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd (ca. 1126-98), who came to be known in the Latin West as Averroes, was born at Cordoba into a family prominent for its expert devotion to the study and development of religious law (shar'ia). In Arabic sources al-Hafid (“the Grandson”) is added to his name to distinguish him from his grandfather (d. 1126), a famous Malikite jurist who served the ruling Almoravid regime as qadi (judge) and even as (...) imam (prayer leader and chief religious authority) at the magnificent Great Mosque which still stands today in the city of Averroes' birth and where Averroes himself served as Grand Qadi (chief judge). When the governing regime changed with the success of 'Abd al-Mu'min (r. 1130-63), founder of the Almohad (al-Muwahhidun) dynasty, the members of the family continued to flourish under a new religious orientation based on the teachings of the reformer, al-Mah. di ibn Tumart (d. ca. 1129-30). Although insistent on the strict adherence to religious law, Ibn Tumart's teachings were at the same time equally insistent on the essential rationality of human understanding of the existence and unity (tawhid) of God and his creation as well as the rationality of the Qur'an and its interpretation. (shrink)

The passionate and staunch defence of logic of the controversial thinker Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd of Córdoba (384-456/994-1064), had lasting consequences in the Islamic world. Indeed, his book Facilitating the Understanding of the Rules of Logic and Introduction Thereto, with Common Expressions and Juristic Examples (Kitāb al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq wa-l-mudkhal ilayhi bi-l-alfāẓ al-ʿāmmiyya wa-l-amthila al-fiqhiyya), composed in 1025-1029, was well known and discussed during and after his time; and it paved the way for the studies (...) of his compatriots Ibn Bājjah (d. 1138), Ibn Ṭufayl (1185), and Ibn Rushd (1198), who each gave demonstrative reasoning a privileged place within the methods of attaining knowledge. Unfortunately, as too often in the history of science, Ibn Ḥazm’s innovative perspectives and contributions in logic have been overlooked or considered with an attitude of contempt. On the one hand, his work has been seen, at best, as promulgating the benefits of studying Aristotle’s logic, so that his contribution is assessed as more didactical than conceptual. And on the other hand, those who do examine his innovations often consider them to be mistaken. As indicated by Chejne (1984, p. 2) contempt towards the logical work of Ibn Ḥazm was also present in its reception by the Eastern philosophers who accused him of deviating from Aristotelian logic and of dabbling in things beyond his capability. However, a reassessment of his work on logic has since begun, by delving into the ways the thinker of Córdoba studied the links between deontic and modal qualification of propositions. In this context Lameer’s (2013) paper on the logical sources of Ibn Ḥazm is worth mentioning; the author (p. 417, footnote 1) observes that, although, strictly speaking, it was al-Fārābī who first drew the parallelism between deontic and modal concepts, it was Ibn Ḥazm who developed it and worked it out in a more precise manner. A primary aim of this paper is to help fill some of these gaps by stressing the role of the work of Ibn Ḥazm in developing a notion of deontic necessity deeply rooted in legal normativity, and in explicitly discussing the transference between deontic and modal concepts. According to our view; the basic units of Islamic deontic logic are what we might call, indulging in terminological anachronism, heteronomous imperatives. As it turns out, the heteronomy of imperatives within Islamic legal systems contrasts with those of the purely moral realm, which seem to be closer to an autonomous conception of moral law. There it concurs again with Leibniz’s proposal to define obligatory as “what is necessary for a good person to do”. In the present paper, we will focus on the heteronomous imperatives of legal systems rather than on the imperatives of the purely moral realm. In this context, the work of Ibn Ḥazm extends the parallelism between the necessity of events and that of human actions stressed by his predecessors. According to our understanding, Ibn Ḥazm’s parallelism can be rendered explicit formally by means of a conditional (or hypothetical) structure shared by both deontic and modal propositions. Moreover, this structure makes apparent that this parallelism displays an underlying system of “degrees”. Indeed, while in the domain of events, given some conditions, it makes sense to distinguish between an event that is more likely to happen than another. Ibn Ḥazm speaks of near and distant possibility (such as the higher degree of likelihood of rain, given the condensation of clouds in December, and its lower degree, when the condensation occurs in summer); and, in the domain of actions, the Islamic notion of weighting actions determines degrees of virtue (or of legal and moral value). So whereas the degree of virtue of performing a forbidden act as determined by the distribution of sanction and reward is 0, we obtain the same value by pondering the likelihood of an impossible event to take place. Furthermore, as discussed in section II.3.2, the system of values at work in the parallelism can be seen as opening the way to a more direct correspondence. Thus, while in the realm of nature, likelihood of occurrence of an event is dependent upon the conditions specific to the occurrence of that event; while, in the realm of jurisprudence, likelihood of performing an action is dependent upon the distribution of reward and sanction specific to that action (being that, given the choice to perform or not perform a given action, those that will be rewarded are more likely to be performed than those that are not). According to this perspective, the point of the parallelism is that both deontic and modal qualifications measure the degree of an action or event to become actual; that is – indulging once more in anachronism (but this time from the Leibnizian background) – the degree measures how feasible (facile) an action or event may be. This suggests that Ibn Ḥazm’s perspectives already herald the links to probability and possibility explored by Leibniz six centuries later – see for example Leibniz’s (1671, A VI, I, p. 424-26) use of probability in the context of conditional right. Nevertheless, it also shows a crucial difference to the approach developed in the Elementa Jura Naturalis: whereas Leibniz’s studies seek to define what is to be just or virtuous, the logical system of deontic imperatives within Islamic jurisprudence presupposes that what is to be virtuous has already been settled. Determining what is to be virtuous is not achieved by logical reasoning within the system of legal jurisprudence, but by delving into the higher objectives of the Sharīʿa. While developing our point, we will delve into the logical structure of the heteronomous imperatives. This distinguishes our contribution from the existing literature, such as the papers of Chejne (1984), Lameer (2014), and Guerrero (1997, 2010, 2014), which do not provide a logical analysis of the deontic concepts put into work by Ibn Ḥazm. The true antecedent to the present paper is the work of Farid Zidani (2007, 2015), who, so far as we know, was the first to undertake such a task. Some of our own developments and general epistemological thoughts go beyond Ibn Ḥazm’s framework and motivations; mainly those contained in sections II.3.2 and IV. However, according to our view, these reflections suggest that Ibn Ḥazm’s approach has the substance for a broader and deeper exploration of the logic of norms. The paper is structured as follows:I.Ibn Ḥazm’s Logic of Heteronomous Imperatives. After presenting some extracts of the relevant text, we proceed by providing a formal reconstruction of the five forms of deontic modalities. II. A Landmark in the History of the Logical Analysis of Norms. Duties and Modalities. In this section, we study the transferences from deontic to modal necessity and possibility. We briefly compare the deontic system of Islamic Jurisprudence with that of Leibniz.III. Leibniz and Hypothetical Imperatives in Law.IV. Beyond Ibn Ḥazm: Conclusions and the Work Ahead. We will conclude the paper by discussing briefly some conceptual points that distinguish the logic of heteronomous imperatives from contemporary deontic logic. Our final words will discuss deontic-modal parallelism in the context of Ibn Ḥazm’s rejection of reasoning by conjecture and what we call “the internalization of nature.”. (shrink)

Muhammad al-Shahrastani, the famous Muslim theologian of the 12th century and author of the Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects, was greatly influenced by Ismaili teachings. In this work al-Shahrastani refutes the metaphysics of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) from an Ismaili point of view.

Le nom d'Averroès est celui d'un scandale. Voici l'homme d'une thèse folle qui soutient que l'intellect est séparé des individus et unique pour toute l'espèce. Conséquence? La négation de la proposition «je pense» : la ruine de la rationalité. Pendant cinq cents ans, l'Europe s'en offusquera. Comment comprendre cette histoire qui mêle fascination et rejet? D'où vient que l'averroïsme récusé d'emblée n'ait cessé de reparaître? Avec Freud, ce livre propose une réponse. Averroès, alias Ab(...) 1-Walïd Muhammad ibn Ahmad (...) Ibn Ru(...)d, est l'archétype d'une «inquiétante étrangeté» venue perturber la latinité. (shrink)

_This mirror for princes sheds light on the relationship between spiritual and political authority in early modern Egypt_ This guide to political behavior and expediency offers advice to Sufi shaykhs, or spiritual guides, on how to interact and negotiate with powerful secular officials, judges, and treasurers, or emirs. Translated into English for the first time, it is a unique account of the relationship between spiritual and political authority in late medieval / early modern Islamic society.

El objeto de este libro es mostrar quién fue, qué pensó y cual es el sentido, para nosotros, del pensamiento de Abu al-Ualíd Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Ahmad Ibn Ruxd, en adelante Averroes, nombre que deriva de la latinización del apelativo Ibn Ruxd, nacido en Córdoba en 1126 y muerto en Marrakex en 1181. Su impronta en la cultura de su tiempo le hizo figurar nada menos que entre el auténtico canon (...) onomástico de la teología y la filosofía medievales que supuso La Divina Comedia de Dante, o en el parnaso de la filosofía de Rafael en "La escuela de Atenas". Y eso no resulta incompatible con su peso central en el pensamiento racionalista que marcó el rumbo de la modernidad de donde surge nuestro mundo presente. Averroes supone una cima del pensamiento universal en cualquier tiempo y lugar. Entre los límites cronológicos que encierran una vida como la de Averroes no podemos lograr totalidades, más allá de un conjunto de fragmentos, indicios, referencias indirectas procedentes de datos que nos ofrecen autores contemporáneos o sucesores. El conjunto de todas esas informaciones, que forman la biografía del filósofo, resulta ser muy escaso y poco ilustrativo si lo comparamos con la trayectoria de su pensamiento, un proceso intelectual cuyo prodigioso esfuerzo racional deja en la sombra al Averroes persona en beneficio del Averroes pensador. Frente a los momentos destacados de una vida, cuyos límites espaciales o geográficos vienen determinados por continuos desplazamientos de ida y vuelta entre Córdoba, Sevilla y Marrakex, lugares donde desempeñó cargos oficiales, sobresale un constante y sostenido esfuerzo intelectual plasmado en sus 92 obras escritas en 72 años de vida del filósofo. (shrink)

Two Andalusian Philosophers is a short but comprehensive introduction to the central concerns of Islamic philosophy and its relationship with sharia law. The Story of Hayy ibn Yaqzan by Ibn Tufayl and The Definitive Statement by Averroes represent the last, great flourish of Islamic philosophy in twelfth century Andalusia. The influence of Averroes upon Latin scholastic philosophy is well known (although the content of his writings may be rather less familiar to a modern readership). Ibn Tufayls reputation rests primarily upon (...) Hayy ibn Yaqzan, which is among the most accessible of Islamic mystical writings. Widely known in English translation during the early eighteenth century, he was an important influence upon the composition of Robinson Crusoe. (shrink)